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Abstract: Civil conflicts devastate public health both in the short run 
and in the long run. Analyzing novel data sets that include yearly 
information on public health and the availability of health professionals 
across provinces in Turkey in the 1964-2010 period, we provide empirical 
evidence for our theoretical argument that a major mechanism through 
which civil conflicts exert their long term negative influences on public 
health is by discouraging medical personnel to practice in conflict 
regions. We also  assess the effectiveness of certain policy measures 
that Turkish governments have tried out over the years to counteract this 
mechanism. Our results reveal that the long running civil conflict in 
Turkey has been driving away doctors and other highly trained medical 
personnel from conflict areas and that mandatory service requirements do 
help counteract this flight. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Civil conflicts have both immediate and long-term effects on social well-being. There is the 
immediate suffering in the form of casualties, displacements, the destruction of infrastructure and 
property. And a recently emerging literature is telling us that the indirect and longer term impacts on 
health (Davis and Kuritsky, 2002; Guha-Sapir and Van Panhuis, 2003; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol; 
2003; Li and Wen, 2005; De Walque and Filmer, 2012; Akresh et al.,2009), education (for a detailed 
review see Kıbrıs, 2015), economic activity (Collier et al., 2003; Collier, 1999), and social cohesion 
and trust (Kıbrıs, 2014; Wood, 2008; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013) are even more substantial. 
Nonetheless, Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue in their detailed review of this literature that we are 
still far from a complete understanding of the damages civil conflicts inflict upon societies. The 
important question is not whether these conflicts harm societies, but rather in what ways, how 
much, and how persistently—all crucial questions for understanding the impacts on economic, 
political and social development, as well as priorities for post-conflict assistance. 
 This study contributes to the literature that addresses these crucial questions. By analyzing 
novel data sets from Turkey, we provide empirical evidence for yet another negative consequence of 
civil conflicts. We show that the enduring civil conflict in Turkey has been driving away medical 
personnel from conflict areas. This is an important, yet academically neglected mechanism through 
which civil conflicts exert their long-term negative influences on public health. We also assess the 
effectiveness of certain policy measures that Turkish governments used to intervene in the medical 
labor market to offset the disparity between the conflict zone and other parts of the country. While 
our results indicate that higher salaries do not increase medical personnel counts, mandatory service 
requirements are associated with higher number of doctors  
 It is well established that civil conflicts inflict long term damage to public health. The ebola 
outbreak in sub-saharan Africa constitutes the latest example. Of the 32 sub-Saharan African states 
to have experienced internal armed conflict since 1976, nearly a third have also experienced ebola 
outbreaks. In fact, the virus appears to be tracking ongoing and recent civil wars in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (1976), Gabon (1996), Uganda (2000), Gabon again (2001), Congo (2002) to 
today’s outbreak in West Africa (Fazal, 2014; Maxman, 2014). What we need at this point is to 
develop a thorough understanding of the mechanisms through which civil conflicts damage public 
health so that we can devise effective counteractive policies. We argue that the flight of medical 
personnel is one such mechanism which, despite its importance, has not received much scholarly 
attention. While there are studies which have theoretically acknowledged the existence of such a 
mechanism, to our knowledge, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence of the flight of 
health professionals from conflict areas. The main reason why the issue has been left unexplored is 
the lack of data. Information systems that record the indicators of social well-being often cease to 
function in societies experiencing civil conflict. It is also common that officials refuse to share 
information in an effort to hide the true extent of the damage caused by the conflict. Consequently, 
data on the availability of medical personnel across locations and time is hard to come by for 
countries with civil conflicts. 
 The second major contribution of our study is the provision of such data for Turkey. 
Through extensive research on Turkish State Archives, we have constructed a novel data set that 
includes yearly information on the number of doctors, nurses, dentists, midwives, and health 
technicians across provinces in Turkey between 1964 and 2010, along with some important public 
health indicators. This time-series-cross-section panel, which spans an impressive 46-year period, 
enables us to analyze whether the Kurdish-Turkish armed conflict that has been going on since 
1984 has had an impact on the supply of medical professionals in conflict areas. The results reveal a 
significant negative impact. We then look into the role medical personnel play in public health. 
Finally, we analyze two different policies employed by the Turkish governments over the years, and 
investigate whether those policies proved effective in halting the flight of the medical personnel out 
from the conflict areas and in improving public health. We believe this exercise provides important 
clues for developing effective counteractive policies. 
2. PUBLIC HEALTH AND CIVIL CONFLICTS 
 Civil conflicts damage the ability of civilians to lead a long, and healthy life (Ghobarah, 
Huth and Russett, 2003; Iqbal, 2006) resulting in a persistent increase in mortality rates (Guha-
Sapir and Van Panhuis, 2003; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Li and Wen, 2005; De Walque and 
Filmer, 2012). Previous research suggests that a significant portion of this increase results from an 
increased spread of infectious diseases (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010). Berrang-Ford, Lundine 
and Brau (2011), for example, associate the reemergence of the Human African Trypanosomiasis 
disease in sub-Saharan Africa with the armed conflicts in the region. Akresh et al. (2009) reveal the 
stunting effect of the civil conflict on the physical development of children in Rwanda. Davis and 
Kuritsky (2002) show that in sub-Saharan Africa, countries which have experienced violent conflict 
have significantly worse health indicators compared to peaceful countries. 
 Despite the ample evidence on the detrimental impacts of civil conflicts on public health we 
still lack a complete understanding of the mechanisms behind these impacts to formulate effective 
policies to counteract the damage. Existing works offer theoretical discussions on what these 
mechanisms might be, but they do not empirically analyze those mechanisms nor the extent of the 
damage caused by them. One very comprehensive theoretical discussion is offered by Ghobarah, 
Huth, and Russett (2003; 2004). They identify five major mechanisms: (1) The destruction of 
infrastructure such as hospitals, roads, water supply, and power grids; (2) The increased risk of 
exposure to diseases due to displacement of large populations and poor conditions in refugee 
camps; (3) The lack of financial resources due to economic hardship; (4) The diversion of existing 
resources to military use leading to resource scarcity in the health sector; (5) The flight of medical 
professionals from conflict areas. Iqbal (2006) adds to this list the disruptions in agricultural 
production which may then lead to widespread famines.  
 In this study, we focus on the flight of medical personnel from conflict areas, and provide 
empirical evidence from the Turkish case. We then analyze two specific policies that Turkish 
governments  implemented in order to halt this flight. We believe our work provides important clues 
for devising effective policies to counteract the negative impacts of civil conflicts on public health.  
3. THE TURKISH CASE 
3.1 The Civil Conflict 
 Since late 1984, Turkey is experiencing an insurgency campaign led by the Kurdish 
separatist guerrilla organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK. 
The PKK was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in 
southeastern Turkey, though later on in the 1990s, it appeared to have aimed for a federal structure 
that would grant more autonomy to the large Kurdish minority in Turkey.  The armed activities of 
the PKK have been almost completely concentrated in Southeastern and Eastern Turkey which is a 
poor, and underdeveloped part of the country, and which has traditionally been inhabited by ethnic 
Kurds. 
 Financially, the conflict has cost the country billions of dollars. But more importantly, it has 
cost more than 40 thousand lives (Şener, 2010). Our knowledge about civilian and insurgent 
casualties is limited to aggregate numbers sporadically released by contending sources. 
Nevertheless, Kıbrıs (2011; 2015; 2014) offers a unique database on security force (i.e., soldiers and 
police officers) casualties (SFCs). 
  
Chart 1(a) depicts the total number of SFCs over the years, and Chart 1(b) presents their 
geographical distribution. As can be seen in Chart 1(a), the 90s has been the most bloody period of 
the conflict. The PKK received a major setback when its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 
Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried and sentenced to life in prison. Due in part to this lack 
of leadership, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, peace in the area did not 
last long. The PKK resumed its attacks in 2004 and continued up until the latest cease fire in March 
2013. The destructiveness of the conflict resulted in the deepening of the economic and social 
disparity between the conflict zone and the rest of the country. The area has lost its economic and 
social appeal for business and people, and has come to be considered as exile by public employees 
like doctors and teachers who are subject to periodical appointments by the state.  
Chart 1(a): Total Number of Security Force Casualties  
0
300
600
900
1200
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
3.2 The Health Sector in Turkey 
 Up until recent years, the health sector in Turkey has been almost entirely public. Private 
hospitals accounted for less than 3% of hospital beds across the country in 1990, 8% in 1999, and 
15% in 2010. In other words, the state has been the biggest (and in less developed and rural areas, 
the only) employer and service provider in health. Consequently, state employment policies have 
almost completely determined the demand side of the labor market in medical professionals.  
 The state has been very influential on the supply side of the market as well by heavily 
regulating it with strict legal codes. The Turkish law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 
1928) states that in Turkey only medical professionals of Turkish nationality with a medical 
diploma officially recognized by the Turkish Ministry of Health can provide services to Turkish 
citizens. This regulation was relaxed in 2012 to allow private health institutions to employ foreign 
national doctors (Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 2012). Note that this legal structure 
combined with the public nature of the sector almost completely limits the supply side of the 
medical labor market to domestic human resources. 
 The public nature of the sector is associated with its main problems as well. Turkey has 
always performed among the worst in financial and human health resources among OECD members 
(OECD, 2015).  Another important problem in the sector has been the sharp geographical disparities 
in the allocation of  available resources. While the developed urban centers of the West received the 
largest share in especially human resources, the East was left behind. In this study, we argue that the 
enduring civil conflict has been an important factor behind this disparity. By damaging the 
socioeconomic life and by creating security concerns the conflict has been driving away highly 
trained medical personnel from conflict areas, and as such has been contributing to the geographical 
disparities in the distribution of health resources across the country. Chart 2 plots the average 
number of specialist doctors across provinces in the 1964-2010 period. As can be seen clearly, 
Eastern and Southeastern provinces have the lowest numbers of specialist doctors. 
 Note that international medical aid organizations, like Red Cross, or Médecins Sans 
Frontières have never intervened in the conflict in Turkey. As we mentioned above, the Turkish law 
bans foreign nationals from providing health services to Turkish citizens in Turkey. We have 
contacted the Turkish Health Ministry and the Turkish Medical Association to inquire about the 
actual practice, and learnt that such institutions are allowed to provide medical services in Turkey 
only in cases of humanitarian crises like natural disasters, but even then they need permission from 
the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Health. Note that the conflict in Turkey 
has been a low intensity one, and as such it has never created humanitarian crisis situations like the 
conflicts in Rwanda or Somalia where public services and even the state collapsed completely. 
Consequently, it has not attracted the attention of international medical aid institutions. The only 
exception took place in 1996 when  Médecins Sans Frontières applied formally together with the 
Turkish Medical Association of Doctors to conduct a vaccination and prenatal care campaign in 
southeastern Turkey. That application was turned down by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 
reasons of national security.  
   
4. THE DATA 
 In this study, we employ a novel database that includes the  number of specialist and general 
practitioner doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, and health technicians across provinces in Turkey 
in the 1964-2010 period. To construct this database we conducted a thorough study in the Turkish 
State Archives. We provide a detailed list of our sources in the References section. Our database 
also includes the yearly percentages of births unattended by health personnel for the 1964-1981 and 
1993-2005 periods, age-zero group BCG vaccination rates for the 1994-2006 period, and the yearly 
number of open positions for doctors at public health institutions for the 2004-2012 period across 
provinces.  
 In order to measure the intensity of the conflict, we refer to the casualty database by Kıbrıs 
(2011; 2014; 2015). This is a unique data set on Turkish military and police force casualties 
(security force casualties-SFCs) that the Kurdish insurgency claimed since the beginning of armed 
attacks in 1984. The data set includes the date, and place of death for a total of 6851 SFCs.  The 
number of SFCs provide our measure of conflict intensity across provinces. While SFCs do not 
correspond to total casualties, which is a commonly used measure of conflict intensity in the 
literature, we expect a high correlation between the two. In fact, the yearly aggregates are 98% 
correlated with the yearly total number of PKK attacks reported by the Turkish General Staff 
(Şener, 2010), and 96% correlated with the yearly total casualties reported by the Federation of 
American Scientists (www.fas.org). Other socioeconomic indicators included in our models are 
derived from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. Table 1  presents the descriptive statistics. Note that 
all our variables are measured at the aggregate province level employing data that had already been 
released in various other publications. Consequently, ethical approval is not required for our study. 
5. THE ANALYSES 
5.1 Conflict and Availability of Medical Professionals 
 In our base model, the dependent variable is the number of medical professionals across 
provinces. We present the frequency distributions of our dependent variables in Chart A1 in the 
appendix. As the histograms clearly reveal, these are highly skewed, over-dispersed count variables 
which only take strictly positive integer values. Accordingly, we estimate the parameters of the 
following fixed effects negative binomial regression model: 
E(Yi,t) = λi,t = exp(α + β1Ci,t-1 + β2Xi,t + β3T + β4P + ui,t) 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Time span Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Number of specialist doctors 1964-2003
2006-2010
341,15 1112 1 14437
Number of general practitioner 
doctors
1964-2003
2006-2010
306,45 766,97 5 9625
Number of dentists 1964-2003
2006-2010
133,64 440,4 1 5636
Number of nurses 1964-2003 477,13 989,59 4 10112
Number of midwives 1964-2003 309,34 370,12 4 3271
Number of health technicians 1964-2003 261,91 449,57 11 5377
Security force casualties in 
previous year
1964-2010 1,67 9,83 0 236
Population in ten thousands 1964-2010 73,55 104,29 0,51 1362,42
GDP per capita in constant prices 1975-2001 11408,98 6386,92 746,8 44889
Percentage of births unattended 
by medical personnel
1964-1981
1993-2006
18,24 17,53 0 100
BCG vaccination rates among 
new borns
1994-2006 75,82 20,89 2 100
Number of open MD positions at 
public health institutions
2004-2012 42,22 48,36 0 305
All variables are observed at the province level. Due to administrative changes the number of provinces changed 
over the years.
where Yit is the number of medical professionals in province i in year t. We analyze the number of 
specialist doctors, general practitioner doctors, dentists, midwives, nurses, health technicians and 
the total number of medical professionals respectively in the 1964-2010 period. Ci,t-1 is the number 
of security force casualties in province i in year (t-1); Xit is the population of province i in year t in 
ten thousands; T and P are vectors of year and province dummies controlling for time and province 
specific effects respectively. Population numbers allow us to control for the demand for medical 
professionals, and also for the size of the locality. We were also able to collect data on GDP per 
capita in constant prices across provinces for the 1975-2001 period. We also present the results we 
get when we include this covariate in the model (restricting the time period of our analyses 
accordingly).  
 Table 2 presents the results from the first set of models and Chart 3 visualizes them. For ease 
of reading we report the natural log of estimated parameters which corresponds to the incidence 
rate ratio and gives the multiplicative change in the dependent variable associated with a unit 
change in the control variable. The estimated incidence rate ratio for SFCs, for example, tells us that 
an additional SFC leads the number of specialist doctors to be multiplied by 0.992, or in other 
words, is associated with a 0.8% decline in the number of specialist doctors. We report the 
estimated average marginal effects in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 As the results  demonstrate, except for health technicians, the conflict is significantly and 
negatively associated with the number of medical professionals across provinces. The association is 
more substantial for specialist doctors and dentists, whereas it is insignificant for health technicians. 
This is not a surprising pattern considering that specialists and dentists are the most specialized 
doctors with the most education among the professionals we consider whereas technicians are the 
least educated.  As such, specialists and dentists are expected to be the most, and technicians the 
least mobile group. 
 A look at the distribution of SFCs over the years and provinces reveals the magnitude of the 
impact more clearly. In 1993, the average number of SFCs in provinces with casualties was 26 with 
12 provinces above this average. Based on the estimated coefficients, a province with 26 SFCs is 
expected to have 20% less specialist doctors, 10% less general practitioner doctors, 12% less 
dentists, 5% less nurses, and 10% less midwives in 1994 compared to similar size provinces with no 
casualties. These declines correspond to 38% less specialists, 20% less general practitioners, 25% 
less dentists, 11% less midwives in provinces with around 56 SFCs, which is only one standard 
deviation away from the average. 
   
Table 2: Results of the negative binomial regressions - Base model
Reported coefficients are incidence rate ratios 
Dependent 
variable: Number of 
specialist 
doctors
Number of 
specialist 
doctors
Number of 
general 
practitioner 
doctors
Number of 
general 
practitioner 
doctors
Number of 
dentists
Number of 
dentistsIndependent 
Variables
Number of SFCs 
in previous year
0.992***
(-8.91)
0.997***
(-2.82)
0.996***
(-5.54)
0.998***
(-3.38)
0.995***
(-4.38)
0.998
(-1.40)
Population in ten 
thousands
0.999***
(-5.00)
0.999
(-1.59)
0.999***
(-5.92)
0.999
(-0.91)
1.0002*
(1.77)
1.0007***
(5.02)
GDP per capita 
in constant 
prices
1.000***
(5.48)
1.000
(1.51)
1.000***
(6.88)
Province and 
year dummies Not reported, available upon request.
Number of 
observations 3175 1927 3177 1927 3171 1926
Log likelihood -14545.79 -8207.10 -15238.75 -8963.21 -12592.02 -7702.03
AIC 29183.58 16474.21 30569.49 17986.42 25276.04 15464.07
BIC 29462.48 16641.12 30848.42 18153.33 25554.88 15630.97
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. z-values in parenthesis
 We have also examined the predictive performance of our model by conducting twofold 
cross-validation tests. We have randomly set aside 20 percent of our observations, and fit the model  
Chart 3: The predicted association between the number of health professionals and security force casualties
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Table 2-continued: Results of the negative binomial regressions - Base model
Reported coefficients are incidence rate ratios 
Dependent 
variable: 
Number of 
nurses
Number of 
nurses
Number of 
midwives
Number of 
midwives
Number of 
health 
technicians
Number of 
health 
technicians
Total number 
of health 
professionals
Total number 
of health 
professionalsIndependent 
Variables
Number of 
SFCs in 
previous year
0.998***
(-2.62)
0.998***
(-2.78)
0.997***
(-5.94)
0.996***
(-5.88)
1.0003
(0.77)
1.0004
(1.07)
0.998***
(-2.95)
0.998***
(-3.12)
Population in 
ten thousands
1.0004***
(6.31)
1.0006***
(8.10)
1.0007****
(9.21)
1.0008***
(9.25)
0.999**
(-2.37)
0.999***
(-4.11)
1.0002***
(2.64)
1.0002***
(3.06)
GDP per 
capita in 
constant 
prices
1.000***
(10.18)
1.000***
(8.29)
0.999
(-0.53)
1.000***
(7.54)
Province and 
year dummies
Not reported, available upon request.
Number of 
observations 2693 1847 2693 1847 2692 1847 2682 1846
Log likelihood -13771.7 -9515.3 -13797.8 -9395.1 -13045.9 -8759.8 -16702.3 -11.338.4
AIC 27623.4 19088.6 27675.6 18848.2 26171.8 17577.5 33484.6 22734.9
BIC 27859.3 19248.8 27911.5 19008.3 26407.7 17737.6 33720.4 22894.9
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level.  z-values in parenthesis
on the remaining 80 percent. Then we used the observations we had excluded as a test bed to see 
how accurately our model can predict them. Chart A2 in the appendix depicts the results. As can be 
seen the predicted values and the actual observations fit well .  
 Our results are also robust to alternative model specifications. There is an ongoing debate in 
the literature about the possible shortcomings of the nonlinear fixed effects estimators, most 
importantly the “incidental parameters problem” which jeopardizes the unbiasedness of estimates. 
We deal with this problem by employing the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression 
estimator by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) (as implemented in Stata via the “xtnbreg, fe” 
command). Their estimator avoids the incidental parameters problem by conditioning the likelihood 
function for each panel by the sum of the counts for that panel. Nonetheless, we also estimate the 
random effects specification of our model. The results, which are available upon request are almost 
identical. We also log transform our dependent variables and reestimate a linear version of our 
model with OLS. The results, which we present in Table A2 in the appendix, remain very similar. 
Finally, we reestimate our original negative binomial model with the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. The results, which are available upon request, remain consistent.  
5.2 Availability of Medical Personnel and Public Health 
 There is an extensive literature which clearly establishes the positive impact of the 
availability of medical professionals on public health. In a recent review of this literature Starfield, 
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Shi and Macinko (2007) reanalyze the results of recent studies conducted in the United States, and 
find that supply of primary care physicians is negatively associated with mortality rates. Similarly, 
Gulliford (2002) demonstrates that higher general practitioner supply dampens mortality rates in 
Great Britain. Shi (2012) reviews the literature on the association between the supply of primary 
care physicians and various health outcomes and concludes that increasing the supply of primary 
care physicians by one unit per 10,000 population might improve health outcomes by as much as 
10.8%. Similarly, Shi et al. (2004) find that the supply of general practitioners is negatively 
associated with infant mortality and low birth weight. Pierard (2014) reaches a similar conclusion 
with Canadian data. Sakai et al. (2015) demonstrate the positive association in Japan between the 
supply of pediatricians and vaccination coverage in kids. Gai and Yan (2014) report a similar 
association between the supply of family physicians and influenza vaccination rates in the U.S.. 
Lavy et al. (1996) find out that an increase in the number of doctors in Ghana would reduce the 
height gap between a Ghanaian child and an American child. Recent studies also document the 
positive impact of physician availability on cancer detection (Gorey et al., 2010; Roetzheim et al., 
2000) and survival rates (Sundmacher and Leonie, 2011; Ananthakrishnan et al., 2010).   
 In light of these results, we argue that the flight of medical personnel away from conflict 
areas is an important mechanism through which civil conflicts hurt public health. We have 
conducted some preliminary tests of this argument with our data as well. Specifically, we analyze 
whether and how the predicted numbers of health professionals we obtain from our base model are 
associated with the percentage of births unattended by medical personnel and BCG vaccination 
rates among new borns in Turkey across provinces and years. The analyses and the results which 
are presented in the appendix in Tables A3 and A4 support our argument and demonstrate that the 
supply of medical professionals, which we predict as a function of conflict intensity, is associated 
with improvements in public health indicators.  
6. CARROTS AND STICKS: PAY THEM MORE OR OBLIGE THEM TO WORK 
 Over the years Turkish governments  implemented certain policies to intervene in the health 
labor market to counteract the conflict’s negative impact on physician availability, and to ameliorate 
the disparity across regions. In 1988, in response to increased PKK activity in the region, a state of 
emergency was declared in 13 provinces in the Southeast. It was then decided that public servants 
in those provinces were to be paid around 30% more compared to their colleagues in other parts of 
the country (Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 1988). This policy remained in place until 
2002 (some provinces regained normal status earlier in 1996). Another such interventionist policy is 
the mandatory service requirement for doctors that was implemented between 1982 and 1994, and 
from 2006 onwards (Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 1981; 2005).  The policy requires 
doctors to serve for two years in places they are appointed to by the state.  The appointment is 
conducted randomly via a lottery. Every year (every two months after 2006) the Ministry of Health 
announces open positions for specialists and general practitioners. Doctors who have just graduated 
or who have just completed their specialization declare their preferred provinces, and get assigned 
to their preferred location if the number of doctors who prefer that province does not exceed the 
number open of positions in the province. For highly demanded provinces a lottery is held and those 
who fail to attain their primary choice are then randomly assigned to other open positions. Note that 
because everyone prefers the western metropolitan areas, this procedure basically amounts to 
randomly assigning doctors to open positions, a great  number of which are in the conflict areas. 
 To analyze whether these two policies have been successful, we modify our original model 
to include an additional pay policy dummy (D1i,t) and a mandatory service requirement dummy 
(D2i,t). These dummies take on the value 1 in those provinces and years these policies were in 
effect. We also include an interaction variable between casualties and the mandatory service 
requirement dummy to identify whether the mandatory service requirement had a differential 
association with respect to conflict intensity. In other words, we estimate the following count 
model: 
E(Yi,t) = λi,t = exp(α + β1Ci,t-1 + β2Xi,t + β3D1i,t + β4D2i,t + β5D2i,t*Ci,t-1 +β6T + β7P + ui,t) 
Table 3  presents the results, and Charts 4(a)-4(d) visualize them. 
Table 3: Results of the fixed effects negative binomial regressions on the number of medical 
personnel - Policy analyses
Reported coefficients are incidence rate ratios.
Dependent variable: Number of specialist 
doctors
Number of general practitioner 
doctors
Independent Variables
Number of SFCs in previous year 0.995***
(-4.42)
0.997**
(-2.33)
Population in ten thousands 0.999***
(-6.72)
0.999*
(-1.87)
Additional pay policy dummy 0.829***
(-5.37)
0.807***
(-4.76)
Mandatory service dummy 1.968***
(16.35)
1.614***
(9.11)
Interaction between mandatory service 
and casualties
1.005***
(4.03)
1.002
(1.06)
Year and province dummies not reported, available upon request
Number of observations 3175 3177
Log likelihood -14821 -16653
AIC 29901 33564
BIC 30683 34347
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. z-values in parentheses.
Interestingly, the results indicate a significant drop in numbers in places where the additional pay 
policy was in effect. This drop is most probably due to the fact that the policy was employed only in 
provinces under the state of emergency, and that the state of emergency was declared when and 
where the armed conflict was really intense. In other words, the policy dummy is capturing the 
impact of high conflict intensity. Unfortunately we can only observe the net impact of the additional 
pay policy and high conflict intensity as the geographical and temporal overlap disables us from 
Chart 4(a) Chart 4(b)
Chart 4(c) Chart 4(d)
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separating one from the other. This overlap also prevents us from analyzing the differential 
association the additional pay policy may have with medical personnel availability in conflict areas. 
The interaction variable between the SFCs and additional pay policy dummy turns out to be 96% 
correlated with the SFC series and thus, cannot be included in the model without causing severe 
multicollinearity. Nonetheless, even though we are not able to decipher the exact association 
between the additional pay policy and medical personnel availability, the results clearly reveal that 
the 30% additional pay was not enough to  ameliorate the situation  in the state of emergency zone. 
 Such identification problems are less prevalent when analyzing whether and how the 
mandatory service requirement policy is associated with physician availability. The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the mandatory service requirement is associated with almost a two-fold 
increase in the number of doctors, and the magnitude of the association is even greater in conflict 
areas. Note that the widening of the error bands in Charts 4(c) and (d) towards the right is due to 
having fewer observations with such high casualties during the years mandatory service 
requirement was in place. 
 Next we explore whether the increase in doctor counts that comes with the mandatory 
service requirement brings about an improvement in public health in conflict areas. To do that we 
focus our attention to the 2005-2006 period when the mandatory service requirement policy was 
reintroduced, and estimate the following Tobit regression model 
Zi,t = α + β1Ci,t-1 + β2Xi,t + β3D2t + β4D2i,t*Ci,t-1 + β5P + ui,t 
where Zi,t will be the percentage of births unattended by medical personnel, and BCG vaccination 
rates among new borns in province i, in year t respectively. D2 is the policy dummy and takes on 
the value 1 for year 2006 when the mandatory service requirement was reintroduced. We also 
estimate an alternative model in which we include a dummy for emergency zone status to 
differentiate those provinces that have been at the heart of the conflict and to account for high levels 
of violence in the past. Note that because emergency zone status is a province level fixed effect, we 
control for other province level unobservables with random effects in this alternative specification. 
Table 4 demonstrates how the mandatory service requirement policy counteracts the negative 
effects conflict inflicts upon public health in conflict areas when it is implemented.  
While each additional SFC is associated with a 0.31 point increase in the percentage of births 
unattended by medical personnel, the introduction of the policy decreases the percentage to 0.11 
Table 4: Results of the Tobit regressions on public health indicators - Policy analyses
Fixed effects 
specification
Random effects 
specification
Fixed effects 
specification
Random effects 
specification
Dependent variable: Percentage of 
births 
unattended by 
medical 
personnel
Percentage of 
births 
unattended by 
medical 
personnel
BCG 
vaccination rate 
among new 
borns
BCG 
vaccination rate 
among new 
bornsIndependent Variables
Number of SFCs in 
previous year
0.311***
(3.00)
0.338**
(2.44)
-2.58***
(-5.30)
-1.51***
(-3.67)
Population in ten 
thousands
-0.003
(-0.08)
-0.002
(-0.38)
-0.029
(-0.19)
0.013**
(2.48)
Mandatory service policy 
dummy
-0.644***
(-4.96)
-0.643***
(3.68)
-0.677
(-1.12)
-0.581
(-0.70)
Interaction between 
mandatory service policy 
dummy and the number 
of SFCs in previous year
-0.197***
(-3.15)
-0.209**
(-2.45)
1.791***
(6.10)
1.249***
(3.92)
Emergency zone dummy 15.329***
(8.01)
3.81
(1.51)
Standard error for 
province level random 
effects
0.969 0.546
Log likelihood -179.65 -402.88 -427.12 -535.42
AIC 529.31 821.76 1026.24 1086.84
BIC 791.75 846.46 1291.77 1111.54
Number of observations: 162                               
Hausman test
H0: Difference in coefficients between the fixed and random effects specifications is not systematic.
Chi^2
(p-value)
-0.11
Hausman test is not well-defined.
12.99
(0.01)
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. z-values in parenthesis.
points. Similarly, while each additional SFC is associated with a 2.58 points decrease in the BCG 
vaccination rates among new borns, with the introduction of the policy, the damage goes down to 
0.79 points. Charts 5a and 5b visualize these results. 
 Further evidence of how medical personnel availability is negatively associated with conflict 
intensity and positively associated with the mandatory service requirement policy comes from a 
closer look at the open position announcements by the Turkish Ministry of Health. We estimate a 
negative binomial fixed effects model to analyze the association between the yearly number of open 
positions and conflict intensity across provinces over the 2007-2011 period. We control for per 
capita number of general practitioner doctors in the previous year to account for the demand for 
doctors; the number of one-year-lagged SFCs to account for recent episodes of violence; and the 
total amount of bank deposits to account for economic development. We also estimate an alternative 
specification with random effects in which we include a dummy for emergency zone status to 
account for high levels of violence in the past. The results are presented in Table 5. 
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The fixed and random effects specifications yield very similar results and indicate that compared to 
other provinces, each year a significantly higher number of open positions are announced in 
provinces with recent and past casualties. 
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Table 5: Results of the negative binomial regression on the number of open positions
Reported coefficients are incidence rate ratios.
Fixed effects 
specification
Random effects 
specification
Dependent variable: Yearly total number of open positions
Independent Variables
Number of SF casualties in previous year 1.022***
(2.69)
1.022***
(3.08)
Number of practitioners per ten thousand 
inhabitants in previous year
1.001
(0.96)
0.999
(-0.75)
Emergency zone dummy 1.423**
(2.33)
Bank deposits 1.000
(1.18)
0.999
(-1.20)
Standard error for province level random effects 1,453
Log likelihood -1696 -2221
AIC 3401.84 4456.04
BIC 3418.48 4485.25
Hausman test
H0: Difference in coefficients between the fixed and random effects specifications is not systematic.
Chi^2
(p-value)
-164.33
Hausman test is not well-defined.
Number of observations: 480                  Number of groups: 80                  Observations per group: 6
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. z-values in parentheses.
 Note that if the mandatory service requirement is effective in counteracting the flight of 
doctors from conflict areas, then, with the reinstatement of the policy in 2006, we should see a 
decrease in the number of open positions in those areas. Table 6  presents the results when, we focus 
our attention to the 2005-2006 period and estimate the above fixed and random effects regressions 
on the number of open positions including a policy dummy to account for the policy change in 2006 
and its interaction with SF casualties. Chart 7 visualizes these results. The results indicate that the 
policy dampens the positive association between conflict intensity and open positions. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 This study demonstrates how the enduring civil conflict in Turkey has been driving away 
medical personnel from conflict areas, and by doing so, draws attention to an important, yet never 
analyzed before mechanism through which civil conflicts exert their long-term negative influences 
on public health. We emphasize that there are also other mechanisms, like the destruction of 
infrastructure and the lack of financial resources which in many cases operate simultaneously, and 
Table 6: Results of the negative binomial regression on the number of open positions
Reported coefficients are incidence rate ratios. 
Fixed effects specification Random effects specification
Dependent variable: Yearly total number of open positions
Independent Variables
Number of SF casualties in previous year 1.19**
(3.76)
1.11**
(2.28)
Population in ten thousands 1.005
(0.92)
1.006
(1.40)
Bank deposits 0.999
(-0.96)
0.999
(-1.56)
Emergency zone status 4.64***
(4.21)
Mandatory service policy dummy 3.37***
(7.90)
2.88***
(6.40)
Interaction between mandatory service policy 
dummy and the number of SFCs in previous year
0.874***
(-3.96)
0.918***
(-2.61)
Standard error for province level random effects 0.547
Log likelihood -202 -584
AIC 417.64 1187.79
BIC 435.38 1215.47
Hausman test
H0: Difference in coefficients between the fixed and random effects specifications is not systematic.
Chi^2
(p-value)
16.31
(0.006)
Number of observations:160                      Number of groups: 80                    Observations per group: 
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. z-values in parentheses.
which, compared to the flight of medical professionals, might have larger impacts on public health. 
Nevertheless, the lack of empirical studies on those other possible mechanisms prevents us from 
conducting such comparisons. Future research is needed to evaluate the different simultaneously 
existing mechanisms, which might also have interactive effects. The destruction of infrastructure, 
for example, is likely to feed the flight of medical professionals by damaging practice conditions 
and post-graduate training possibilities for them. This is especially true for specialist doctors since 
they require advanced hospital facilities. For similar reasons, we also expect the flight of medical 
personnel to self-perpetuate because medical practice is a process of  life-time learning which 
requires a lively work environment where medical professionals can consult and learn from each 
other.   
 Our work is also related to the literature on the international migration of physicians from 
developing countries to rich Western nations. The works in this literature cite low-pay, insufficient 
postgraduate training opportunities, general economic and social conditions, and poor practice 
conditions as the main reasons of physician migration from developing countries (Hagopian et al., 
2005). All of these reasons are valid for within-country migration of medical personnel as well, 
especially in countries with substantial geographical disparities in development. Note that civil 
conflicts create most of these reasons. Moreover they add security concerns to the list of reasons for 
migration. 
 Our contribution extends to policy development as well. We assess the effectiveness of two 
policy measures that Turkish governments  implemented over the years to intervene in the medical 
labor market to offset the disparity between the conflict zone and other parts of the country. The 
first policy amounted to paying about 30% more to doctors who serve in high conflict areas. Similar 
policies have been employed by developing countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya against the 
brain-drain they have been experiencing in their health sectors (Hagopian et al., 2005;  Physicians 
for Human Rights, 2003). It turns out that in the Turkish case 30% more did not lead to an 
improvement. An interesting question is  how much more the government would have to pay the 
medical personnel to stop the flight, and whether such payments would have been feasible. We 
know from the experiences of sub-Saharan African countries that budgetary difficulties may lead to 
partial or insufficient implementation of such policies (Physicians for Human Rights, 2003). The 
second policy that we analyzed is the mandatory service requirement which is still in place today in 
Turkey for doctors. Again, we see similar approaches in international migration cases. Ghana, for 
example had a program that required medical school graduates to serve for 5 years before 
emigration or else pay back the cost of their education. The literature argues that policies that create 
barriers to flight serve as “bonding” strategies which give people time to bond with the location 
(Hagopian et al., 2005). In time young graduates get established in their posts, start families and 
settle. And as they do so they become less likely to migrate, especially those highly educated people 
for whom migration is more of a household decision. According to our results the mandatory 
service requirement policy has been much more effective in boosting the number of doctors in 
conflict areas and thus, in counteracting the damage on public health. Nevertheless, it fails to fully 
compensate for the negative association between the conflict and the supply of doctors. It seems 
neither carrots nor sticks yield stellar results on their own.  
8. APPENDIX 
The appendix is online at …http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/akibris/files/2015/11/Appendix.pdf 
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